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1071 
BLOGGING AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP† 
LAWRENCE B. SOLUM∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION: THE WRONG QUESTION 
Will blogging somehow transform legal scholarship? That is the wrong 
question. The thesis of this essay is that blogging is essentially 
epiphenomenal—an effect and not a cause. Blogging is merely a particular 
medium—a currently popular form of Web-based publishing. Nonetheless, 
the emergence of academic legal blogging is an important indicator of 
other trends—real causes that are driving significant transformative 
processes. These trends include the emergence of the short form, the 
obsolescence of exclusive rights, and the trend toward the 
disintermediation of legal scholarship. Those forces and their relationship 
to blogging will be the primary focus of this paper. 
But first, a word about the relationship of blogging to legal scholarship. 
Let me begin with a caveat or two. First caveat: it seems to me obvious 
that this relationship is in its early formative stages. The sergeants-at-law 
might have thought that the printing press had nothing to do with the 
practice of law—after all, law is almost entirely an oral activity, isn’t it? 
The late-nineteenth-century legal practitioner might have thought that law 
reviews have almost nothing to do with legal scholarship—after all, it’s all 
about treatises, isn’t it? The mid-twentieth-century law professor might 
have thought that peer-reviewed journals and academic presses have 
nothing do with legal scholarship—after all, it’s all about law reviews and 
the legal presses, isn’t it? And the early-twenty-first-century scholar might 
think that blogs have nothing to do with legal scholarship—after all, it’s 
 
 
 †  © 2006 by the Author. Permission is hereby granted to duplicate this paper for scholarly or 
teaching purposes, including permission to reproduce multiple copies or post on the Internet for 
classroom use and to quote extended passages in scholarly work, subject only to the requirement that 
this copyright notice, the title of the article, and the name of the author be prominently included in the 
copy or extended excerpt. Permission is hereby granted to use short excerpts (500 words or less) with 
an appropriate citation and without inclusion of a copyright notice. In the event of the death or 
permanent incapacity of the author, all claims to copyright in the work are relinquished and the work is 
dedicated to the public domain in perpetuity. 
 ∗ John E. Cribbet Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law. Blog: Legal Theory 
Blog, http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory. I owe special thanks to Larry Ribstein with whom I have 
had many illuminating conversations about blogging. See Larry Ribstein, From Bricks to Pajamas: 
The Law and Economics of Amateur Journalism, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=700961.  
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all about interdisciplinary, peer-reviewed journals, and the academic 
presses, isn’t it? To the extent that blogs have anything to do with legal 
scholarship, the relationship has just begun to emerge. Undoubtedly it will 
change. 
A second caveat is important. These remarks about blogging and legal 
scholarship are not the product of systematic study or theorizing. Much of 
what follows is based on personal impressions and anecdotal evidence. As 
a participant observer at the interface between blogging and scholarship, I 
have formed a variety of impressions, but many of these are hunches and 
speculative hypotheses. 
With those caveats in mind, there are, of course, plenty of indicators 
that blogs do have “something to do” with legal scholarship. Take, for 
example, the survey of citations to legal blogs conducted by Ian Best and 
posted on his blog 3L Epiphany.1 
Seventy-five blogs were cited, and the citing publications included the 
California Law Review,2 the Columbia Law Review,3 the Cornell Law 
Review,4 the Harvard Law Review,5 the Michigan Law Review,6 the New 
York University Law Review,7 the Texas Law Review,8 the University of 
Chicago Law Review,9 the University of Pennsylvania Law Review,10 the 
 
 
 1. 3L Epiphany [now Law Blog Metrics], http://3lepiphany.typepad.com/3l_epiphany/files/ 
law_review_articles_citing_ legal_blogs/index.html (Aug. 16, 2006). 
 2. Keenan D. Kmiec, Comment, The Origin and Current Meanings of “Judicial Activism,” 92 
CAL. L. REV. 1441, 1476 n.228 (2004) (citing How Appealing, http://legalaffairs.org/howappealing). 
 3. Theodore W. Ruger et al., The Supreme Court Forecasting Project: Legal and Political 
Science Approaches to Predicting Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1150, 1160 
n.36 (2004) (citing (The Return of) Ignatz, http://sheldman.blogspot.com). 
 4. W. Bradley Wendel, Legal Ethics and the Separation of Law and Morals, 91 CORNELL L. 
REV. 67, 76 n.20, 78 n.26 (2005) (citing Balkinization, http://www.balkin.blogspot.com). 
 5. Kenneth Anderson, Squaring the Circle? Reconciling Sovereignty and Global Governance 
through Global Governance Networks, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1255, 1286 n.48 (2005) (reviewing ANNE-
MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004) and citing Legal Theory Blog, http://lsolum. 
blogspot.com). 
 6. Neil S. Siegel, A Theory in Search of a Court, and Itself: Judicial Minimalism at the Supreme 
Court Bar, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1951, 1968 n.72 (2005) (citing Sentencing Law and Policy, 
http://sentencing.typepad.com). 
 7. Cass R. Sunstein, Group Judgments: Statistical Means, Deliberations, and Information 
Markets, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 1022 n.293 (2005) (citing Lessig Blog, www.lessig.org/blog). 
 8. J. Cam Barker, Note, Grossly Excessive Penalties in the Battle Against Illegal File-Sharing: 
The Troubling Effects of Aggregating Minimum Statutory Damages for Copyright Infringement, 83 
TEX. L. REV. 525, 530–31 n.33 (2004) (citing Legal Theory Blog, http://lsolum.blogspot.com). 
 9. Michael C. Dorf, After Bureaucracy, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1245, 1263 n.59 (2004) (reviewing 
MARK TUSHNET, THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER (2003) and citing Balkinization, 
http://www.balkin.blogspot.com). 
 10. Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in Federal Criminal Justice, 
154 U. PA. L. REV. 79, 86 n.18, 151 n.220, 153 n.223 (2005) (citing Sentencing Law and Policy, 
http://sentencing.typepad.com/). 
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Virginia Law Review,11 and the Yale Law Journal.12 Best also has a 
collection of cases citing blogs,13 and the list of courts includes the United 
States Supreme Court and the United States Courts of Appeals for the 
Second, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, as well as numerous federal trial 
courts, state supreme courts, and state intermediate courts. 
Two stories about my own blog—Legal Theory Blog—are illustrative 
of the ways in which blogs can “relate” to legal scholarship. The first story 
concerns an eight-part series of posts entitled “Legal Theory Bookclub: 
Free Culture by Lawrence Lessig,”14 At the request of the editors of the 
Texas Law Review, these posts were collected, lightly edited, and 
published as a sixteen-thousand-word review of Lessig’s book.15 Whatever 
the merits of the posts and the review, they both clearly are “legal 
scholarship” by any reasonable definition of that term. 
The second story concerns a series of exchanges with Jack Balkin, who 
at the time ran Balkinization as a solo blog. In response to a column by 
Eddie Lazarus16 I posted a detailed reply,17 prompting Jack Balkin to 
publish a post entitled “Good Judging and ‘Following the Rules Laid 
Down.’”18 I countered with “A Neoformalist Manifesto,”19 followed by 
Balkin’s “Good Judging and ‘Following the Rules Laid Down,’ Part II.”20 
The exchange ended with my “Fear and Loathing in New Haven.”21 The 
exchange, conducted over the course of four days, runs almost fourteen 
thousand words. Without characterizing my own contributions, I believe 
 
 
 11. Steven M. Haas, Note, Toward a Controlling Shareholder Safe Harbor, 90 VA. L. REV. 2245, 
2278 n.161 (2004) (citing ProfessorBainbridge.com, http://www.professorbainbridge.com). 
 12. Kevin S. Schwartz, Note, Applying Section 5: Tennessee v. Lane and Judicial Conditions on 
the Congressional Enforcement Power, 114 YALE L.J. 1133, 1136 n.11 (2005) (citing SCOTUSBlog, 
http://www.scotusblog.com). 
 13. 3L Epiphany, http://3lepiphany.typepad.com/3lepiphany /2006/08/cases_citing_le.html (Aug. 
6, 2006). 
 14. Legal Theory Blog, http://lsolum.blogspot.com/archives/2004_03_01_lsolum_archive.html# 
108057665667719921 (Mar. 29, 2004, 10:10 a.m.) (with links to seven additional posts). 
 15. Lawrence B. Solum, The Future of Copyright, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1137 (2005). 
 16. Edward Lazarus, A Recent Dissent by Federal Appellate Judge Alex Kozinski Offers Rare 
Candor About the Political Nature of the Judicial Process, FINDLAW, May 15, 2003, 
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/lazarus/20030515.html. 
 17. Legal Theory Blog, http://lsolum.blogspot.com/2003_05_01_lsolum_archive.html# 
200304841 (May 17, 2003, 2:20 p.m.). 
 18. Posting of Jack Balkin to Balkinization, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2003_05_18_ 
balkinarchive.html#94523316 (May 18, 2003, 12:21 a.m.). 
 19. Legal Theory Blog, http://lsolum.blogspot.com/2003_05_01_lsolum_archive.html# 
200307682 (May 18, 2003, 3:00 p.m.).  
 20. Posting of Jack Balkin to Balkinization, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2003_05_18_balkin_ 
archive.html #94561782 (May 18, 2003, 11:26 p.m.). 
 21. Legal Theory Blog, http://lsolum.blogspot.com/2003_05_01_lsolum_archive.html# 
200315303 (May 20, 2003, 11:17 a.m.). 
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that it is fair to say that Balkin’s contributions to the exchange were 
eloquent, powerful, and intellectually rigorous. Balkin’s side of the 
exchange gave me the sense that the possibilities of blogging transcended 
the one-paragraph post; Balkin’s blogging blurred the lines between 
conventional legal scholarship and bloggership. No one who read the 
exchange would be likely to conclude that it had nothing to do with legal 
scholarship. 
So it is clear that blogging has something to do with legal scholarship, 
but in my opinion, that something is really beside a more important point. 
The blog or weblog is really just a form of publication on the Internet that 
utilizes the World Wide Web and software to reduce the costs of self-
publishing. Everything that can be done on a “blog” can be done using 
other tools and formats. Indeed, many “home pages” share most of the 
characteristics of blogs. The important set of questions isn’t about the 
relationship between blogs and legal scholarship. The important set of 
questions concern the fundamental forces that have produced academic 
blogging. 
In this essay, I shall explore three important trends in legal scholarship: 
the transition from the long form to the short form, the transition from 
exclusive rights to open access, and the transition from mediation to 
disintermediation. This exploration will be organized as follows. Part II 
will establish a baseline by sketching the ancien régime—the world of 
legal scholarship as it existed before the Internet and as it continues to 
exist today. Part III explores the current trends that point in the direction 
of new forms of legal scholarship and new practices for its dissemination. 
Part IV returns to the topic at hand: the relationship between blogs and 
legal scholarship. 
II. THE ANCIEN RÉGIME: LONG FORM, EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS, AND 
INTERMEDIARIES 
In order to understand the transformative potential of blogging, we 
need to take a look at the world before blogs—the fading landscape of the 
long form, exclusive rights, and intermediaries. Legal scholarship’s past is 
the world of law reviews and treatises, peer-reviewed journals and 
university press books.22 
 
 
 22. Parts II and III of this essay draw substantially on my Download It While It’s Hot: Open 
Access, Intermediaries, and the Dissemination of Legal Scholarship, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2006). 
p 1071 Solum book pages.doc9/20/2007  
 
 
 
 
 
2006] THE TRANSFORMATION OF LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 1075 
 
 
 
 
A.  The Long Form and its Long Tail 
Law review articles are long. We all know that! But in a certain sense, 
the law review article was the “short form” of its era. Before there were 
law reviews there were treatises, and the most influential legal scholars 
were the treatise writers—the heirs of Blackstone and Chancellor Kent. 
The names are still famous: Corbin, Davis, Moore, Nimmer, Wigmore, 
Williston, and Wright. The multivolume treatises were and are long. 
Really long! Dozens of volumes. Millions of words. Cases in the tens of 
thousands. 
By comparison, law review articles are short. A mere sixty to one-
hundred pages was considered a respectable length for a serious piece of 
legal scholarship—one that took a doctrinal topic and turned it inside out 
and upside down, comprehensively surveying the literature and the 
authoritative legal materials. But long-form legal scholarship was not read 
much. In part, this was intentional. The treatises were not meant to be read 
straight through because they were really encyclopedias, not monographs. 
Law review articles were intended to be read straight through, but aside 
from a few success stories, it seems likely that even moderately successful 
law review articles are read by small (albeit important) communities of 
scholars. Even more distressing, it seems likely that some (perhaps many) 
law review articles had and have virtually no readers beyond their authors, 
editors, and those assigned to evaluate the work if it is relevant to a tenure 
decision or lateral hire. 
Even though long-form legal scholarship may have very few “top to 
bottom” readers, many of these articles have readers of another sort. Full-
text electronic searching has dramatically reduced the costs of locating 
relevant passages in long articles that address many topics. When articles 
were located via the Index to Legal Periodicals, it surely must have been 
the case that many an author published without knowing that two or three 
paragraphs in a prior article had already addressed some particular 
argument, doctrinal development, or theoretical construct, but Westlaw 
and Lexis make the discovery of such passages very inexpensive. 
Of course, the many hundreds or thousands of law review articles with 
only a few readers each may cumulatively have many readers—the 
proverbial “long tail.”23 And this “long tail” is important—because it 
signals the importance of microaudiences and microcommunities of 
 
 
 23. See Chris Anderson, The Long Tail, WIRED, Oct. 2004, http://www.wired.com/wired/ 
archive/12.10/tail.html. 
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scholars. It would be a mistake to believe that a flourishing legal academy 
could or should produce only “hits” with broad appeal both in and out of 
the academy. Work that reaches only a few in the short run may come to 
have a big impact in the long run. Work on narrow topics may nonetheless 
make a substantial contribution to knowledge about the law and its 
foundations. The long form had and continues to have a long tail. 
So the long form is alive and well, but even before the advent of open 
access and the Internet, legal academics were moving toward short-form 
legal scholarship. Some law reviews began to encourage the submission of 
“essays,” essentially short law review articles.24 Recently, several 
prominent law reviews issued a “Joint Statement on Article Length,” 
which stated, “The vast majority of law review articles can effectively 
convey their arguments within the range of 40–70 law review pages, and 
any impression that law reviews only publish or strongly prefer lengthier 
articles should be dispelled.”25 Of course, by the standards of many 
disciplines, forty pages of small-type law review pages would be 
considered extraordinarily long. 
By any standard, legal scholarship is long. Treatises, law review 
articles, and even articles in peer-reviewed journals are long, and because 
they are long, accessing them is costly. 
B. Copyrights: Exclusive and Exclusionary 
Long-form legal scholarship is associated with another important 
feature—exclusive rights. Copyright law provides exclusive rights to 
copyright owners. The most important of these is the right to control 
copying—which includes the right to control the making of electronic 
copies. Traditional legal scholarship was copyrighted. The publishers of 
treatises hold the copyright or exclusive licenses that provide the 
equivalent rights of exclusion. The typical law review publication 
agreement involved an assignment of copyright from the author to the law 
review (or educational institution of which the law journal was a part). 
It made perfect sense that treatises were copyrighted and that those 
copyrights would be enforced. Treatises were (and are still) published by 
for-profit enterprises. The economics of intellectual property required 
 
 
 24. See Yale Law Journal Submissions, http://www.yalelawjournal.org/submissions.html (last 
visited Mar. 9, 2006) (describing distinction between “articles” and “essays” and stating, “Essays are 
usually significantly leaner than Articles: in general, they occupy fewer pages and rely on less 
voluminous citation.”). 
 25. See Joint Statement on Article Length, http://www.yalelawjournal.org/joint_statement.html 
(last visited Mar. 9, 2006). 
p 1071 Solum book pages.doc9/20/2007  
 
 
 
 
 
2006] THE TRANSFORMATION OF LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 1077 
 
 
 
 
copyright, because exclusive rights create the incentives to invest in the 
creation and dissemination of new works. The theory is that without 
copyright, the treatises would have been “ripped off” by some 
entrepreneurial outfit that would have had lower production costs because 
it would not have had to pay either Wigmore or Little Brown’s editorial 
staff. 
Copyright made less sense in the world of law review articles. Very 
few law review article copyrights have any economic value. I have never 
had an offer from anyone to buy the copyright in one of my articles. Have 
you? I can’t imagine that I would find any takers if I were offer to sell at 
any nontrivial price. There are some indicators that law review articles 
have an economic value. Law reviews do charge for subscriptions, but it 
seems unlikely that copyrights are necessary to protect that income stream. 
For one thing, law reviews operate with free labor and subsidized direct 
costs. It’s not clear that a for-profit enterprise—which would have to pay 
for labor and the costs of capital—could compete. Or to put the same 
points somewhat differently: law schools (and not law review readers) pay 
legal academics to produce legal scholarship. 
Copyright is problematic for another reason. Exclusive and 
exclusionary rights in law review articles create access and dissemination 
problems. A famous example is Lon Fuller’s famous article, Positivism 
and Fidelity to Law—A Reply to Professor Hart,26 published in the 
Harvard Law Review in 1958. Fuller retained the copyright, but after his 
death, obtaining permission to use the article in course packets and 
anthologies became impossible—the orphan work problem.27 
Legal academics want to be read, but exclusive rights are barriers to 
readership. Even if permission is freely granted, seeking it is costly. If 
identification of the rights’ holder is difficult, then the transaction costs are 
likely to pose an insurmountable barrier. It is not clear the copyrights 
increase the supply of legal scholarship and it does seem clear that they 
reduce the demand for it. 
There are signs that the model of exclusive rights is beginning to give 
way. Many student-edited law reviews have begun to permit open access. I 
now insist on open access as a condition of publication, and my experience 
is that most law reviews are willing to modify their publication agreements 
 
 
 26. Lon Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law—A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 
630 (1958). 
 27. The facts related in text are based on personal experience. So far as I know, no published 
source documents the status of Fuller’s estate. 
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to permit open access. Many law reviews now routinely post open-access 
versions of the articles they publish on their Web sites. 
But peer-reviewed journals are different. Most peer-reviewed journals 
are published by academic or for-profit presses that view the content of 
these journals as their intellectual property and as a potential source of 
revenue. Increasingly, peer-reviewed journals are available in electronic 
form, via JSTOR or other closed, proprietary electronic databases, but 
access to these databases is expensive. Very expensive. Just ask a 
librarian. Individual articles may be available for download in exchange 
for payment of a one-time fee, but these fees may be cost-prohibitive. 
Thirty dollars for a single copy of a single article is a typical fee. 
So I will not publish in any peer-reviewed journal without open access. 
And that means that for all practical purposes, I will not publish in most 
peer-reviewed journals. They are dinosaurs. Magnificent beasts, to be sure. 
But they will evolve or become extinct. 
C. Intermediaries: Source and Search 
The ancien régime of legal publication stood on three legs—the long 
form, exclusive rights, and intermediation—the institutions and 
individuals that controlled access to legal scholarship. Let’s take a hard 
look at the intermediaries. One way to slice the intermediation pie is to 
distinguish between “source intermediaries” (publishers) and “search 
intermediaries” (indexers). Both were important. First, let’s take a look at 
source intermediaries. 
1.  Source Intermediaries 
Source intermediaries are individuals and institutions that stand 
between authors and audiences. For reasons both historical and economic, 
the form of intermediation varied depending on whether the mode of 
publication was serial or monograph. 
a.  The Law Reviews and Peer-Reviewed Journals 
With respect to serials, let’s distinguish between law reviews and peer-
reviewed journals. Law reviews were (and are) edited by law students—an 
arrangement that was (and is) unique in the academy and the source of 
much consternation. The reasons for the consternation are obvious and 
familiar. Second- and third-year law students are not experienced legal 
scholars. They are likely to reject important new scholarship when they 
fail to comprehend its significance. They are likely to accept bad 
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scholarship that “sounds impressive” or addresses a “hot topic.” Because 
students are not well acquainted with the literature, they are likely to favor 
scholarship that rehearses old arguments before adding a new point. Of 
course, law students aren’t stupid. They are likely to understand their own 
limitations, and that creates another problem. If student editors cannot 
trust their own judgment, then they are likely to rely on “proxy variables,” 
such as the institutional affiliations of authors or their prior record of 
publication.28 This means that important new scholars at obscure 
institutions can have a terribly difficult time “breaking in” to the prestige 
law reviews. And, even worse, it means that established scholars with a 
“track record” can coast—publishing unimportant, derivative, and 
unoriginal scholarship in the most prestigious venues for years and years. 
The law reviews have been increasingly supplanted by peer-reviewed 
journals—although it is important not to overstate what is still a small 
exception to the general rule. The upside of peer-reviewed journals is 
sophisticated judgment. Experienced academics are better equipped to 
separate the wheat from the chaff. 
Despite their advantages, peer-reviewed journals come with a set of 
problems. Unlike law review editors, peer editors are embedded in social 
networks of professional affiliation. Although some editors meet the very 
highest standards of personal integrity and critical self-awareness, 
enabling them to transcend almost all bias, most academics suffer from the 
usual human foibles. They favor the theories and research of their friends 
and are harshly critical of the views of their professional enemies. Some 
editors favor work of young scholars who are the former students of the 
powerful and ignore those who have studied with the unpopular or the 
obscure. Review that is “blind” in theory may involve “taking a peek” in 
practice. 
Intermediation can create delays. In this regard, student-edited journals 
have a significant advantage over peer-reviewed journals. Student-edited 
journals permit multiple simultaneous submissions. This creates 
competition between journals to make rapid decisions about the most 
sought-after articles. (I have had an article accepted within six hours of 
submission, and I am sure that is nowhere near the record.) But peer-
reviewed journals generally require exclusive submissions—in order to 
reduce the burden on readers, who are themselves prominent and busy 
academics. Student-edited journals can make decisions in days or even 
 
 
 28. See generally Leah M. Christensen & Julie A. Oseid, Navigating the Law Review Article 
Selection Process: An Empirical Study of Those With All the Power—Student Editors, 59 S.C. L. REV. 
465 (forthcoming 2008). 
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hours. Peer-reviewed journals take weeks or months. When combined with 
exclusive submission, this means that the publication of an important 
article can be delayed for years. And if you have been around the business 
in fields where peer-reviewed journals provide the only outlets, you know 
about articles—really fine ones—that simply sit in a drawer after two or 
three rejections (and getting to the drawer may have involved two or three 
years of waiting for rejection letters). 
b.  Legal and Academic Presses 
Intermediation takes a slightly different form in the case of 
monographs. Until recently, most academic legal monographs were 
published by for-profit legal publishers. The for-profit legal publishers 
aimed solidly at their most important and profitable market—practicing 
lawyers. That was all well and good in the era of doctrinal scholarship. But 
once interdisciplinarity took hold of the legal academy, the for-profit, 
practitioner-oriented publishers simply did not provide an outlet, 
prestigious or otherwise, for the kinds of books that sophisticated legal 
academics wanted to write. That was because these books were not aimed 
at practitioners. They were aimed at other legal academics. 
Enter academic legal monographs and the academic presses. Of course, 
there were law books by academic presses even in the heyday of the 
treatise. But it seems clear that the legal academy today is more focused on 
the academic press than it was two or three decades ago. The goal of the 
ambitious law professor is to publish a 300-page monograph with a 
prestigious academic press; it is most assuredly not publication of a 
multivolume treatise. 
There is an irony here. The academic press monograph provides a 
substitute for the long-form law review article. What one would once have 
published as a 150-page law review article, one now publishes as a 300-
page book from a university press. There are certainly advantages to the 
monograph form. Monographs can be a bit longer, and university presses 
encourage writing that can reach a multidisciplinary audience. 
The trend to substitute monographs for long law review articles has not 
been cost free. Whatever was formerly the case, most university presses 
must now “float on their own bottom.” That is, they are expected to turn a 
profit or at least break even. Whereas the law reviews published short 
monographs as articles without regard to the bottom line, the academic 
presses cannot afford this luxury. Obscure areas of law without 
interdisciplinary appeal are poor candidates for book contracts. At least 
one prestigious press has recently discontinued its law and philosophy 
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series—too few sales. And the bottom-line orientation of university 
presses makes open access difficult, if not impossible. 
2.  Search Intermediaries 
The old world involved a second form of intermediation—the role 
played by what I call “search intermediaries.” Once again, the status quo 
consists of a mix between a vanishing set of old-fashioned tools (card 
catalogs and indexes) and the now familiar high-tech tools for searching 
and manipulating electronic texts. 
a.  Card Catalogs and the Index to Legal Periodicals 
Card catalogs no longer consist of three-by-five cards. They have been 
replaced by electronic databases. Like card catalogs, the databases 
facilitate subject-matter-based searches with the Library of Congress 
classification scheme providing the primary organizational system. It is 
not clear whether many legal scholars use electronic card catalogs as a 
research tool. To speak from my own experience, I make very occasional 
use of electronic catalogs. The typical situation involves my having 
identified a monograph published by a traditional for-profit legal 
publisher. Because those books are usually quite expensive, I am more 
likely to borrow them from a library than I am to buy a copy from 
Amazon.com. I am not sure that I have used an electronic card catalog for 
the primary purpose of doing research for more than a decade—although I 
have sometimes found myself using the research capacity of a card catalog 
when I first accessed it for another purpose. 
Another old-fashioned search intermediary is the Index to Legal 
Periodicals. Again, I am not sure there is any data about usage patterns, 
but in my own case, I no longer use the Index to Legal Periodicals for any 
purpose and have not used it for more than a decade. My guess is that I 
would now find the Index (and similar indexes) to be a very crude tool 
when compared to full-text searching. 
b.  Westlaw and Lexis-Nexis 
Functionally, indexes and card catalogs have been replaced by closed 
electronic text databases. There were (and are) two in the United States—
Westlaw and Lexis-Nexis. These databases store vast quantities of legal 
text—cases, statutes, regulations, law review articles, and treatises. The 
data permits the generation of what is called a concordance, which 
correlates words with locations. The existence of a concordance permits 
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Boolean searching. For example, I can search for the word “Coase” 
immediately preceding the word “theorem” and get all instances of the 
phrase “Coase theorem” in a given database. The logical operators 
“AND,” “OR,” and “NOT” are permitted, as are proximity variables, such 
as “Coase” within two words of “theorem.” Boolean searches are 
powerful. 
But the world of Westlaw and Lexis-Nexis is not nirvana because these 
databases are proprietary and closed. They are proprietary—access to the 
search engines is expensive. They are closed—the databases are not 
searchable by Internet search engines such as Google. That means that 
only a tiny fraction of the global population of academics and students has 
meaningful access to these systems. Of course, the fraction that does have 
access is important—it includes most of the legal academics in the North 
Atlantic and Commonwealth democracies. But the group of excluded 
scholars is enormous. Even in the United States, many institutions without 
law schools ration access to Westlaw and Lexis. Outside of Europe and 
North America, access is severely restricted. 
III. THE FUTURE OF LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP: THE SHORT FORM, OPEN 
ACCESS, AND DISINTERMEDIATION 
So what will the future look like? Prediction is always perilous, but I 
will go out on a limb. The future, arriving as you read these words, will 
emphasize the short form over the long, open access over proprietary 
rights, and disintermediation over traditional intermediaries. The future 
will be short and free with very little between the author and the reader. 
A. Short Form 
Legal scholarship today is moving toward the short form. What will the 
short form look like? I think the best strategy is to briefly canvass the 
possibilities: 
• The idea paper—Idea papers have actually been around for a 
long time. In the early stages of a project, you have “the idea”—
the central thesis that will be the part of the article that is 
actually new and moves the literature forward. So you write a 
very short paper—perhaps twenty double-spaced pages—that 
sets out the idea. In the old days, the idea paper might be 
presented at a “brown bag” or “early stage workshop.” But these 
days, the idea paper can be thrown up on the Social Science 
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Research Network (SSRN). And that has important 
consequences. It allows the author to “stake out” the idea—to 
establish “ownership” for the purpose of determining “who came 
up with it first.” And SSRN allows wide circulation. And 
because short papers are short, they may attract readers who 
would find the long-form version to be too costly to assimilate. 
• The blog post—Blogs are a very flexible vehicle for publication. 
Although some blog posts are very short—a sentence or 
paragraph—nothing precludes blog posts that range from a few 
hundred to a few thousand words—long enough to develop a 
significant new idea or argument. One example of an innovative 
use of the blog form is University of Chicago law professor 
Randy Picker’s Picker MobBlog,29 which produces online 
symposia about various topics and articles. SCOTUS blog30 has 
done some very interesting things by inviting scholars and 
practitioners to produce an online discussion about new Supreme 
Court cases on the day they are handed down.31 
• The Wikipedia article—Wikipedia itself is a collaborative, open-
source, open-access encyclopedia.32 The technology underlying 
Wikipedia is the wiki—an engine that permits collaborative 
authorship on the Web. Another model for an online 
collaborative encyclopedia is the Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy. The Stanford project is closed—you must be invited 
to write an article—but it does provide something close to 
“open” access to content of an extremely high quality. One can 
imagine some hybrid emerging as a substitute for the traditional 
treatise. Dozens of scholars might collaborate on an online wiki-
driven Contracts treatise, with all the advantages of massive, 
parallel editing and input. 
By providing a list, I do not mean to predict the future of the short 
form. Just a few years ago, I didn’t even know that blogs and wikis 
existed. Moreover, wikis and blogs are engines—they are the platforms 
 
 
 29. Picker MobBlog, http://picker.typepad.com/. 
 30. SCOTUSblog, http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/. 
 31. See Posting of Sam Bagenstos to SCOTUSblog, http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/ 
archives/2005/06/05-week/ (June 6, 2005, 9:20 p.m.). This is the first of a series of posts on Gonzales 
v. Raich, 541 U.S. 1 (2005). 
 32. Wikilaw, http://wiki-law.org/mwiki/index.php?title= Main_Page, has not had much impact as 
of the date of this writing. 
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that allow for innovation in the development of the short form. It may be 
that these platforms have already created the space in which the “normal” 
version of short form legal scholarship will emerge. It may be that new 
platforms will open up possibilities for the short form that we cannot yet 
see. 
B. Open Access 
The old world was exclusive rights. The new world is open access. 
Open access is important because it reduces the cost of legal scholarship to 
readers. In the old world, you had to go to the library, get the volume of 
the law review off the shelf, and make a photocopy. That was costly. If 
you were a law professor, some of these costs might be subsidized. You 
might be able to shift the costs from your research budget to the library. Or 
you could have a research assistant do the fetching and copying. But it was 
costly enough that you did not want to have to do it twice, and we all 
accumulated photocopies by the hundreds, neatly organized in files or 
piled up in huge disorganized stacks. If you were not a law professor, the 
costs were considerably higher, and every law student from a certain era 
will remember taking copious notes and copying out passages by hand. 
Very costly. 
Open access means doing an online search and then downloading the 
article. When you’re done, you might save it on your hard drive or you 
might just delete it because you can always find it and download it again 
in a matter of minutes or even seconds. There is a digital divide, and not 
everyone has high-speed Internet access, but most academics and students 
do, almost universally in the most developed world and selectively 
elsewhere. Wherever there is high-speed Internet, open access 
dramatically reduces the cost of accessing and using legal scholarship. 
As a practical matter, the most common form of “open access” in the 
legal academy (in the United States, and increasingly among scholars who 
write in English throughout the world) is created by the posting of Articles 
on SSRN. But, of course, posting on SSRN is not true and full open 
access. Articles posted on SSRN are available on the Internet and can be 
downloaded, but unless the article itself grants further permissions, the 
downloaded version cannot be recopied or reposted. SSRN abstracts can 
be crawled, but SSRN does not currently permit full-text searching. And 
this final point is quite important. Because SSRN does not permit full-text 
searching, it falls short of the full promise of open access. Which brings 
me directly to my next topic. 
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C. Disintermediation 
The disintermediation of legal publication is a very recent 
development. Just a few years ago, almost all legal scholarship was 
published after screening by an intermediary, for example, a student 
editorial board, a peer editorial board, or the editors of an academic or 
legal press. Disintermediation involves replacing these intermediary 
institutions with “thin intermediaries” or no intermediary at all. The most 
familiar example of a thin intermediary is SSRN. SSRN mimics the form 
of the peer-reviewed journals—but with thin rather than thick review. You 
cannot just post anything to SSRN. It is “peer-reviewed.” But SSRN does 
not have space constraints. So the threshold for “acceptance” is low. You 
cannot post your recipe collection or a rant about people who use cell 
phones in public places on SSRN. But you probably can post an article 
that advances a fairly kooky legal theory. (Of course, you could probably 
have gotten it published in a law review as well.) SSRN circulates (by e-
mail) abstracting journals, organized by subject matter and institution. 
These perform a mediating function, but there is no pretense of selecting 
only the “best” pieces. Everything written by serious academics will be 
abstracted in the appropriate journal. 
SSRN involves thin intermediation, but the Internet creates 
opportunities for total disintermediation. Legal academics do not need 
SSRN to make their work available on the World Wide Web. Almost 
every college or university provides facilities for the creation of a personal 
home page and server space that can host downloadable papers and 
articles. The linked paper then becomes accessible to Web crawlers, which 
then can provide the full text to the database of a search engine such as 
Google. In some ways, this solution is superior to SSRN because SSRN 
does not facilitate full-text searching. But SSRN has advantages as well. 
Even though it is absurdly easy to create your own web page and upload 
articles, many law professors do not have a clue as to how these simple 
tasks can be accomplished. SSRN provides an institutional framework for 
posting on the Web, and many law schools provide administrative support 
for those who find SSRN’s simple interface to be daunting. 
The importance of Web-based publication is dramatically enhanced by 
the search engine. There are many search engines, but Google dominates 
that business and provides a convenient focus for discussion. Google is not 
a perfect search engine. It does not produce a concordance of the Internet 
and therefore it cannot provide the full range of Boolean searches offered 
by Westlaw and Lexis. Google provides only two Boolean operators 
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(“AND” and “OR”), and Google does not permit proximity searching 
(such as a search of the form “blog” within five words of “constitutional”). 
Despite Google’s limitations, Google is one of the driving forces for 
the disintermediation of legal scholarship. Google itself is accessible to 
anyone who has access to the Internet. Google is very easy to use. Google 
is fast. Google is free. The combination of Google with open access is 
incredibly powerful because it allows for a “direct connection” between 
authors and readers. I put the phrase “direct connection” in scare quotes, 
because, of course, Google itself is an intermediary. Google doesn’t 
present links in random order. It rank orders search results, and the precise 
method for producing the rank order is a trade secret. But Google’s 
success depends on the value delivered by the rank ordering. Google 
wants to get the most relevant and useful results to the top of the rank 
ordering. Indeed, Google offers users the option of searching with the “I’m 
Feeling Lucky” option that will take the user directly to the number one 
link in the rank ordering. 
If you are old-fashioned like me, it may bother you that we are about to 
enter an era when all research will be done on Google or the rival that 
beats Google to the development of the next great search technology. 
Well, not all research, of course. Westlaw and Lexis-Nexis are not going 
away tomorrow. PhD candidates, students writing their law review notes, 
and young associates at big firms will all be required to do exhaustive 
searches using multiple techniques. But undergraduates, ordinary folks, 
and even professionals are increasingly becoming reliant on Google as the 
primary (and perhaps the only) method for doing ordinary, down-and-dirty 
research. 
IV. CONCLUSION: THE TRANSFORMATIVE POTENTIAL OF BLOGGING 
Having surveyed the past of legal scholarship and speculated about its 
future, we can return to the questions with which we began: Do blogs have 
something to do with legal scholarship? Could blogs tranform legal 
scholarship in some way? I have argued for the proposition that blogs are 
symptoms of the larger forces at work in the world of legal scholarship. 
The importance of blogs, if any, is as the medium (or technology) through 
which the incentives and institutional forces that are pushing legal 
scholarship toward the short form, open access, and disintermediation are 
doing their work. If it had not been blogs, it would have been something 
else. If someone invents a medium that provides a more effective or less 
costly mechanism through which the forces can operate, then blogs will 
recede and that medium will take their place. It’s not about the blogging. 
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And when I say it’s not about the blogging, I also mean that 
alternatives to blogs are already on the scene. We already have Wikipedia 
and the “wiki,” the technology that drives open access, open authorship, 
and massively collaborative scholarship.33 Less radical are the closed 
authorship online encyclopedias—the Encyclopedia of Law and 
Economics34 or the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.35 Online paper 
repositories like SSRN and the Berkeley Electronic Press (bepress) are 
already significant forces in the dissemination of legal scholarship. 
So if blogs will play a role in the transformation of legal scholarship, it 
will be a modest one. It seems to me that blogs can function in two ways 
that contribute to the emergence of the new order of short-form, open-
access, disintermediated legal scholarship. First, blogs themselves can 
serve as the medium by which short-form scholarship is written and 
disseminated. That is, blog posts can be legal scholarship. If anyone ever 
thought otherwise, they simply were not paying attention. Blogs can be 
legal scholarship because anything that can be written can be written as a 
blog post. Blogs lend themselves to very short pieces—but blog posts of 
over one thousand words are not uncommon and even longer pieces can be 
broken into several posts. Second, blogs can serve to introduce and 
disseminate legal scholarship. In this regard, the interaction between 
SSRN and the blogosphere is instructive. On Legal Theory Blog, I 
mention or discuss several hundred SSRN papers every year. Other blogs 
interact with SSRN in similar ways. A similar point can be made about the 
blogosphere and other forms of legal scholarship. For example, the “Legal 
Theory Calendar” is a feature of Legal Theory Blog. The calendar 
publicizes talks, workshops, and conferences that may be of interest to 
academics who work in legal theory. Because many workshop, 
colloquium, and conference Web sites have a Web page that includes links 
to the papers that will be presented, blogs can link both to the event and to 
the downloadable paper—once again creating a new channel for the 
dissemination of legal scholarship. Moreover, each individual legal 
scholar can create her own blog—which can serve as vehicle for the 
promotion of the scholar’s own work. 
One might think that blogs are replacing or supplementing the 
traditional intermediaries. There is something to that thought. I am not 
 
 
 33. See Wikipedia, Wiki, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wiki (last visited Apr. 20, 2006). 
 34. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 
2000) available at, http://encyclo.findlaw.com (last visited Apr. 20, 2006). 
 35. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Edward N. Zaita, Spring 2006 ed.), http://plato. 
stanford.edu/ (last visited Apr. 20, 2006). 
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arguing that the old intermediaries will disappear. Blogs serve as an 
alternative channel of information about legal scholarship—an alternative 
form of “peer review” that is more competitive, open, and transparent than 
the traditional peer review processes. Blogs are more competitive for 
obvious reasons. Peer-reviewed journals are expensive to produce and 
their boards of editors are self-perpetuating; although some fields have 
many competing peer-reviewed journals, the editorial boards frequently 
interlock. By contrast, the entry barriers to starting a blog are low, and 
each new blogger is free to compete for readers. Blogs are more open and 
transparent—except for anonymous blogs—because their assessments of 
legal scholarship are available to the whole world via the Internet. By 
contrast, most peer-reviewed journals keep the identity of reviewers secret 
and reveal only which articles were accepted. The reasons for acceptance 
and rejection (but not the identity of the reviewers) are usually 
communicated to the author (or rejected aspirant), but are rarely disclosed 
to others. Of course, competition and transparency can cut in multiple 
directions. Some bloggers may compete for readers by emphasizing the 
accessible and eschewing complex ideas that are difficult to understand. 
Some bloggers may respond to transparency by self-censorship—blogging 
only when they have “something nice” to say. But precisely because 
blogging is transparent, such behaviors are likely to be noticed by readers. 
Blogs, like journals, acquire reputations that affect readership and the 
ways that readers use the information they glean from blogs. 
Prediction is perilous, and I have no special knowledge of the future of 
legal scholarship. But I do have an opinion: we are moving in the direction 
of open access to disintermediated short-form legal scholarship. I am 
much less confident about the specific forms and institutions the future 
will take. But I do have an opinion: blogs will play only a modest 
supporting role in the future of legal scholarship. Scholarship is about 
“papers,” not “posts.” 
 
